Monday, January 31, 2005
The implications of India's Tsunami response
During the time I was working in the Tsunami relief post, several people had written in from India to say that the bureaucracy was perceived to be doing a much better job than is the norm. Now, Sumit Ganguly has written a very interesting piece in The New Republic on India's response to the disaster and what its geo-political implications could be.
Within 48 hours after the waves hit--and despite the near-total destruction of India's only Integrated Defense Command (linking the army, navy and air force) in the Andaman Islands--some 8,000 members of India's armed forces were fanning out to the affected areas of India and its neighbors. Apart from addressing the needs of homeless and bereaved fishermen in Tamil Nadu, they swiftly reached Sri Lanka, a country that has had a tortured relationship with India over the past few decades. On this occasion, however, the Sri Lankan regime did not look askance at the Indian humanitarian effort; instead it publicly welcomed the arrival of the substantial Indian relief contingent. The Indian Navy dispatched two hospital ships to Banda Aceh, Indonesia (it was the first time India has sent a hospital ship abroad) and provided several transport aircraft, a tanker, and a hydrologic survey vessel to the tiny island chain of the Maldives. Even Thailand, a far more prosperous nation, was the recipient of substantial Indian medical and emergency assistance.
What does all this mean geopolitically? First, there is the fact that the left-of-center Congress Party-led government willingly worked with the United States in responding to the tsunami. In the past, such a regime would have gone to great lengths to torpedo any American effort to provide relief in the region. For example, when a massive cyclone hit Bangladesh in 1991, leaving extensive devastation in its wake, India expressed misgivings about the U.S. response, which was called "Operation Sea Angel." These anxieties, a product of the cold-war years, have steadily dissipated over the past decade, replaced by a willingness to work with, and even court, the United States on a range of issues, from anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean to jointly confronting terrorism. Indeed, the growing scope of military-to-military contacts between the two countries over the past several years (a centerpiece of the new Indo-U.S. relationship) made it possible for the two states to play a leading and coordinated role in post-tsunami relief.
There are also regional ramifications to consider. India's willingness and ability to mobilize its civilian and military resources to assist Sri Lanka and the Maldives have not gone unnoticed. Most of the small South Asian states have long perceived India to be at best overbearing and at worst a regional bully. India's efforts to rush emergency assistance to Sri Lanka and its subsequent withdrawal of military forces when they were no longer needed has likely impressed India's neighbors (with the exception of Pakistan).
Of course, as India's behemoth bureaucracy returns to dealing with more mundane tasks, as disputes arise again with the United States, and as the memory of the post-tsunami relief efforts fades, we may see a return to a less self-confident and more self-centered India. It is equally possible, however, that we have just witnessed the birth of a regional leader.
Within 48 hours after the waves hit--and despite the near-total destruction of India's only Integrated Defense Command (linking the army, navy and air force) in the Andaman Islands--some 8,000 members of India's armed forces were fanning out to the affected areas of India and its neighbors. Apart from addressing the needs of homeless and bereaved fishermen in Tamil Nadu, they swiftly reached Sri Lanka, a country that has had a tortured relationship with India over the past few decades. On this occasion, however, the Sri Lankan regime did not look askance at the Indian humanitarian effort; instead it publicly welcomed the arrival of the substantial Indian relief contingent. The Indian Navy dispatched two hospital ships to Banda Aceh, Indonesia (it was the first time India has sent a hospital ship abroad) and provided several transport aircraft, a tanker, and a hydrologic survey vessel to the tiny island chain of the Maldives. Even Thailand, a far more prosperous nation, was the recipient of substantial Indian medical and emergency assistance.
What does all this mean geopolitically? First, there is the fact that the left-of-center Congress Party-led government willingly worked with the United States in responding to the tsunami. In the past, such a regime would have gone to great lengths to torpedo any American effort to provide relief in the region. For example, when a massive cyclone hit Bangladesh in 1991, leaving extensive devastation in its wake, India expressed misgivings about the U.S. response, which was called "Operation Sea Angel." These anxieties, a product of the cold-war years, have steadily dissipated over the past decade, replaced by a willingness to work with, and even court, the United States on a range of issues, from anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean to jointly confronting terrorism. Indeed, the growing scope of military-to-military contacts between the two countries over the past several years (a centerpiece of the new Indo-U.S. relationship) made it possible for the two states to play a leading and coordinated role in post-tsunami relief.
There are also regional ramifications to consider. India's willingness and ability to mobilize its civilian and military resources to assist Sri Lanka and the Maldives have not gone unnoticed. Most of the small South Asian states have long perceived India to be at best overbearing and at worst a regional bully. India's efforts to rush emergency assistance to Sri Lanka and its subsequent withdrawal of military forces when they were no longer needed has likely impressed India's neighbors (with the exception of Pakistan).
Of course, as India's behemoth bureaucracy returns to dealing with more mundane tasks, as disputes arise again with the United States, and as the memory of the post-tsunami relief efforts fades, we may see a return to a less self-confident and more self-centered India. It is equally possible, however, that we have just witnessed the birth of a regional leader.
