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Tuesday, April 20, 2004

Lessons of Operation Bluestar in Najaf 

(Via Arun) The Washington Post is carrying an interesting op-ed by Vali Nasr on how American forces who who have encircled the holy city of Najaf could do well to remember the disasters that followed in the wake of Indira Gandhi's ordering of the Indian Army into the Golden Temple in Amristar.

The trouble was caused by Sikh terrorism, led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his followers who were lodged inside that shrine. Gandhi decided to end the problem by ordering the Indian army to sack the Golden Temple. The terrorists were killed in heavy fighting, but the real casualty was India's stability. Sikh soldiers and units across India reacted to the operation by revolting, and two of Gandhi's trusted Sikh bodyguards took revenge later by killing her. Her murder in turn led to the killing of thousands of Sikhs in New Delhi and other cities in northern India, deeply scarring the country. Gandhi had a strong case for entering the Golden Temple to end Sikh terrorism, many of whose victims were Sikhs. However, the reaction of all Sikhs to the violation of the sanctity of their shrine was uniformly one of horror and anger.

Violating the sanctity of Najaf can similarly inflame Shiite opinion across the Middle East and change the tenor of Shiite politics. It can harden Shiite attitudes toward U.S. occupation and in the process weaken the position of those Shiites who are engaged with the United States. Most notably, it will constrict Ayatollah Sistani in managing Shiite politics. Much has gone wrong for the United States since the fall of Baghdad. However, one thing has gone right, and that is the emergence of Sistani as a major power broker. He has been a moderating influence on Iraqi Shiites, a force for normalization of Iraq's politics, for state building and for the orderly transition of sovereignty.

It is crucial that U.S. policymakers take stock of Sistani's importance and the positive role that he can play in helping America realize its goals in Iraq and the broader region. The U.S. administration must look to strengthen Sistani. This means avoiding radicalizing Shiite politics, increasing Sistani's room to maneuver and making sure that he is able to maintain his legitimacy by delivering on the demands of his community, especially with regard to the constitution and the interim government that will take over on June 30. If he fails to do so, his brand of politics will give way to one that looks to confrontation rather than negotiation.

More importantly and immediately, the United States must allow Sistani to find a solution to the standoff in Najaf. If Sistani is able to preserve the sanctity of the city and prevent bloodshed while addressing U.S. demands, his stature will be enhanced immensely. This is ultimately what America wants -- to empower Sistani and to cage Sadr, to nudge the Shiite community away from combative posturing and toward constructive engagement over the constitution and future of Iraq. The imperative of reining in Sadr and his militia has to be balanced with the larger goal of achieving the U.S. objectives of bringing stability and order to Iraq. Preserving Sistani's position should matter more than crushing Sadr.